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THE LIABILITY OF COMPUTER BULLETIN
BOARD OPERATORS FOR DEFAMATION
POSTED BY OTHERS
Loftus E. Becker, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
New technologies bring new dreams, but the memory of the law is
long and its dreams are often old. In the last decade, millions of Ameri-
cans have bought powerful home computers. One consequence has been
the blossoming of thousands of computer bulletin boards across the na-
tion-indeed, the world-since the first was set up in 1978. Many
computer owners find these boards a new and exciting medium of
communication.
Computer bulletin boards range in size from wholly private boards
run from a small home computer 2 to commercial services run on ex-
tremely powerful, linked mainframe computers3 with hundreds of
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. A.B., Harvard College; LLB.,
University of Pennsylvania. Member, District of Columbia Bar. Work on this article was substan-
tially advanced by two research assistants, Alison Mneek and Laura Welsh. Some statements in
this article about the way computers or computer bulletin boards operate are made without cita-
tion of authority. I have been involved with computers as a programmer since I first worked for
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1961, and with personal computers and
computer bulletin boards for more than five years. Since 1987, 1 have been an Assistant Sysop on
MAUG(r), a set of bulletin boards on the CompuServe network. Otherwise unsupported state-
ments are made from my own experience and knowledge. The opinions expressed here arc entirely
my own.
I welcome comments, electronically CompuServe 76703,4054 or by ordinary mail: University
of Connecticut Law School, 65 Elizabeth Street, Hartford, CT 06105-2290. Copyright (c) 1987-
1989, Loftus E. Becker, Jr.
1. Computer Pornography and Child Exploitation Prevention Act: Hearing on S. 1305 Before
the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary. US. Senate, 99th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 62 (1985) [hereinafter S. 1305 Hearings] (testimony of William J. Cook).
2. In October 1985, it was possible for an individual with a home computer and access to a
telephone line to set up a computer bulletin board with less than S350 of additional expenditure.
Id. at 28 (statement of Jack D. Smith, General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission);
id. at 61-62 (statement of William J. Cook). Today it could be done for less than S100, and a
functioning bulletin board could be started from scratch for under S500.
3. The industry typically groups computers into four categories, depending roughly on the size
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thousands of users. These boards allow users to disseminate their
knowledge, questions, and opinions-within minutes or hours-to wide-
spread audiences. The next section of this article describes in more
detail my definition of the term computer bulletin board; for now, it
can be thought of as the electronic analogy to a public, ordinary bulle-
tin board-a kind of computerized Democracy Wall-on which users
can post whatever information they desire, and from which users can
retrieve information provided by others.
With power come problems. Wide dissemination of knowledge,
ideas, opinions, and exhortations is not always a good thing. Computer
bulletin boards have been used for cheap and convenient communica-
tion among people engaging in sexual activities with young children.0
They have been used to publicize credit card and long-distance charge
numbers,7 and to disseminate illegal copies of copyrighted, commercial
and power of the machine, although with new technology appearing on an almost monthly basis
the divisions are necessarily blurry. "Microcomputers" (or "personal computers") are the small-
est. Typically used by one person, this group includes the various IBM-PC's and clones, and Apple
computers; they usually cost from $400 to $10,000. "Minicomputers" are larger, more expensive,
and often used simultaneously by several people. "Mainframe" computers are quite large, typi-
cally requiring a room or rooms to themselves, and extremely powerful. Sold by only a few mak-
ers, they are owned or rented by organizations such as NASA, universities, and large private
businesses. "Supercomputers" are rare, extraordinarily fast, and expensive; the best known are
those manufactured by Cray, and there are fewer than 500 in existence. World Market Dynamics
in High Performance Computing, SUPERCOMPUTING Rav. Dec. 1989, at 38, 39.
4. Although the major-services are chary about revealing details, an on-line newsletter called
Interactivity Report estimated in March 1989, half a million subscribers for CompuServe,
275,000 for Dow Jones News/Retrieval, and 150,000 for General Electric's GEnie network. Com-
puServe Information Service, Survey Finds 1.6 Million Online, ONLINE TODAY, March 23, 1989
(OLT-598).
5. In general, anyone with the proper equipment and access to a telephone line can get access
to a computer bulletin board. The cost of accessing a private board will typically be the cost of the
telephone call, whether local or long distance. Commercial boards generally charge access fees
ranging from $5.00 to $30.00 or more per hour, and provide local phone numbers throughout most
of the continental United States. Access from other countries and continents is typically more
expensive.
Notwithstanding the costs, commercial services in the U.S. are regularly used by Canadians
and frequently used by correspondents in Asia, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand,
6. S. 1305 Hearings, supra note 1, at 16-18 (opening statement of Special Agent Kenneth V.
Lanning, FBI); id. at 31 (testimony of Henry Hudson, Commonwealth's Attorney, Arlington, Va.)
(five computer systems in operation in the Washington, D.C. area communicating "information
pertaining to children disposed to engage in sexual activities with adults," including one with the
reported capacity to transmit photographic images).
7. After Newsweek published a signed article critical of computer "hackers," the author found
his Visa account number posted on a number of private bulletin boards. Writer Feels Wrath of
Computer Buffs Angered by Article, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1984, § 1, at 88, col. 4.
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computer programs.8 A computer bulletin board (like most means of
communication) can be used to commit or facilitate almost any imagin-
able kind of legal wrong.
One important question is the liability of operators of computer
bulletin boards when their boards are used by others to further unlaw-
ful ends. When are operators of a computer bulletin board criminally
or civilly responsible for the dissemination of information placed on the
bulletin board by third parties, that may be tortious, criminal, or in
violation of copyright-and when should operators be responsible? The
answer to these questions will not only directly affect the legal rights of
some thousands of system operators. The answers will also help deter-
mine whether computer bulletin boards continue to develop as a wide-
spread alternative to the far more limited, traditional methods of
communication."
At the moment, legal issues surrounding computer bulletin boards
comprise a land with no maps and few native guides.10 There are analo-
8. In the summer of 1986, one frustrated Macintosh user on a large public service complained
that a local pirate bulletin board had a broader selection of commercial software available for
downloading than any nearby computer store offered for sale.
9. Of course, traditional print, wire, and broadcast media at present allow individuals to get a
message to far more people (or to a few people, but more quickly) than computer bulletin boards.
But traditional media have substantial limitations. Phone calls are cheap but reach only a few.
Letters to periodicals may reach a wide audience, but only a few letters are actually printed and
those few are often heavily edited. Advertising, in periodicals or on radio or television, can reach
many people, but at a cost prohibitive for most individuals.
10. There are a few published discussions. See, e.g., J.D. VALLACE & R.W. MORIuSON. SYS-
LAW: THE Sysop's LEGAL MANUAL 45-46 (1988) (discussing the question briefly and advising
caution on the part of system operators); Comment, An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin
Boards and the First Amendment, 39 FED. COMM. LJ. 217 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Elec-
tronic Soapbox] (discussing some of these questions, primarily from a constitutional perspective);
Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for User Misuse, 54 FORDItA L REV. 439
(1985) (considering potential tort liability at some length and potential criminal liability in a
paragraph; it takes the position, contrary to that urged in this article, that bulletin boards are
primary publishers of defamation posted by third parties); Soma, Smith & Sprague, Legal Analy-
sis of Electronic Bulletin Board Activities, 7 W. NEw ENG. L REv. 571 (1985) (collecting a
considerable number of state and federal criminal statutes directly regulating the transmission of
information on bulletin boards); Stevens & Hoffman, Tort Liability for Defamation by Computer,
6 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 91 (1977) (an early article, written before the first public com-
puter bulletin board was started in 1978, focusing on liability for inaccurate credit reports dissem-
inated by computerized credit reporting firms).
The most extensive discussion is Note, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation: Who
Should Be Liable? Under What Standard?, 2 J. L. & TEci 121 (1987). Taking a position di-
rectly contrary to that argued here, that Note objects to any rules that would "require different
treatment for different bulletin boards or even for different uses of the same board," Id. at 140,
and proposes a single "new standard of liability specific to computer bulletin boards." Id. at 123.
Absent voluntary action by bulletin boards, the author of the note proposes federal legislation
1989]
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gies in the law, which have dealt specifically with the responsibility of
telegraph and telephone companies, broadcasters, publishers, and news-
dealers for passing along defamatory statements. But the analogies are
not obvious, and the traditions not fully coherent. Nor have answers
been clarified either by litigation or by legislation.
My purpose in this article is to provide some answers to the ques-
tion of liability for defamation resulting from computer bulletin board
use. I choose this particular topic for two reasons. Since tort litigation
is instituted by private parties, and there are a host of potential plain-
tiffs, we can expect to see the first cases arising shortly.11 Application
of the peculiarly "medieval" tort of defamation to yet another new
technology makes the subject particularly interesting.
My discussion is influenced by two particular considerations. First,
I believe that computer bulletin boards should be taken seriously as a
medium of communication. Although it would be premature to claim
that they have an influence comparable to the printed press or the
broadcast media,12 computer bulletin boards are important to many
people now. It is certainly conceivable that in twenty or thirty years
they may be more important to most Americans than printed newspa-
pers and books. Second, and contrary to the position taken by previous
writers on the subject,l a it is a mistake to turn the legal rules on
whether or not an entity is called a computer bulletin board. Instead,
we should recognize that computer bulletin boards transmit different
kinds of information in different ways, and apply different regulatory
norms to the very different ways of communicating information
through them. We should not be misled by a label into thinking that all
communication through computer bulletin boards is the same.
Part II of this article describes the computer bulletin boards of
which I write, and the (in my view) very different services they provide.
adopting his standard and, perhaps, licensing and regulation of bulletin boards by the FCC. Id. at
149-50. The author does not discuss the question whether licensing of such a means of communi-
cation would be constitutional.
11. Cf Complaint, Thompson v. Predaina, No. IP-88 93C (S.D. Ind. filed Jan. 27, 1988)
(alleging wrongful disclosure of private messages and defamation through messages posted by the
system operator).
12. They are not, however, without influence. The Wall Street Journal has noted that a recent
FCC proposal that would increase access charges by about $5.00 per hour had generated more
than 5,000 letters of comment by the date of the article's publication, which was before the close
of the comment period. Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1987, at 41, col. 3. The greatest number of letters
ever generated by an FCC proposal regarding the telephone system was 6,000. Id.
13. Comment, Electronic Soapbox, supra note 10; Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator
Liability for User Misuse, 54 FORDHAM L. Rav. 439 (1985).
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Part III discusses the existing law of defamation. In that section, I ar-
gue that under existing law, some transmissions by computer bulletin
boards should be without liability because the operator should not be
seen as a publisher of the information. Other transmissions, however,
should expose the operator to liability, although only upon a showing
that the operator had actual knowledge that defamatory material was
being transmitted. Part IV briefly considers the impact of the first
amendment on these conclusions.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF COMPUTER BULLETIN BOARDS
Computer bulletin board is not a term of art; it means what the
speaker points to when he says it. Accordingly I shall describe, with
some specificity, just what my subject is.
A. Computer Information Systems
Computer bulletin boards are a subgroup of a more general class
which may be called computer information systems. Such services are a
means to distribute information by computer. They require at least one
computer, to which individual users may gain access. They also require
some capacity to store the information that will be distributed (typi-
cally, magnetic disks or tape); a host program, which controls the com-
puter14 and allows users to gain access to the stored information; a
modem,15 which translates information from a form in which it is usa-
ble by the computer to a form in which it can be transmitted over
telephone lines, and vice versa; and access to one or more telephone
lines. 6 In 1985, a computerized information service could have been
set up for a few hundred dollars.' 7 Generally, however, a useful one
will require an investment of $1000 or more, and commercial services
involve far larger investments.
Using the service is much easier than running it. A user need have
only a terminal-a display device and a keyboard'--connected to a
14. Such host programs are typically designed to run with as little human intervention as
possible. Large commercial systems run host programs designed specifically for that system, and
often implemented and maintained by the system's own stail. Bulletin boards operating on per-
sonal computers more often run free or commercial programs, of which a number are available.
15. Modem is shorthand for modulator-demodulator.
16. There is no theoretical reason that communication need be over telephone lines. It could
be by other methods, ranging from direct connection to radio or satellite communication. In prac-
tice, however, almost all computer bulletin boards presently operate via telephone lines.
17. S. 1305 Hearings, supra note 1, at 63 (statement of William J. Cook).
18. A terminal can be a form of electric typewriter, like an old Teletype machine, or a video
19891
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modem, which in turn is connected to a telephone line, and the infor-
mation (phone number and sometimes passwords) necessary to access
the service.
Computer information services can be usefully divided into two
classes. One class is designed only to distribute information placed in
the system by the operator. Many of the best-known services such as
LEXIS, Dialog, WESTLAW, and Medline are of this kind.1" Users
may access the service to receive information stored in it, but they can-
not add information to the system for distribution to others.20 The sec-
ond category, which I refer to as computer bulletin boards, comprises
systems that store information sent in by users and retransmit that in-
formation to other users. These range from large commercial services,
such as CompuServe and GEnie, with hundreds of thousands of users, 1
through large linked systems, such as FidoNet,22 to individual systems
which at their smallest may have only a few users. Almost anyone can
(and does) run a computer bulletin board, including police depart-
ments, politicians running for office, and state legislatures.2 3
display device and keyboard. Most often these days, however, the user's terminal is a personal
computer running a program which allows the computer to act like an old-fashioned terminal,
19. Technically, this is not quite correct. Due to the way they communicate, many such ser-
vices in fact "echo" to the user everything the user sends to the computer. Moreover, services such
as LEXIS and WESTLAW do take a small amount of information from their subscribers (such
as the name of the client, the matter worked on, search information, and so forth). However, since
this information is not available for general distribution, but only retransmitted to the particular
user, these systems for all practical purposes distribute only information placed there by the ser-
vice operators.
20. At least they are not supposed to be able to do so. I have not heard reports that anyone
has gained access, for instance, to LEXIS to add spurious cases or modify existing ones; but as the
technical ability of young people continues to rise, I expect to see it happen sometime.
21. For instance, CompuServe, a subsidiary of H & R Block, takes in over $70 million in
revenues. S. 1305 Hearings, supra note 1, at 50 (statement of George Minot).
22. FidoNet is an informal network of more than 2,000 personal computer bulletin boards,
located "from Singapore to Stockholm." Manning, Program to Link Mac BBSs Worldwide With
FidoNet, Macintosh Today, Oct. 26, 1987, at 16, cols. 1-2. Each board on the network spends
some time late at night automatically calling other boards and passing messages on, A message
will percolate throughout the United States in about three days. Other well-known networks in-
clude Internet, much in the news recently when it was used to distribute an irritating computer
tapeworm program. See Spreading a Virus, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1988, at 1, col, 1.
23. Garramone, Harris & Anderson, Uses of Political Computer Bulletin Boards, 30 J.
BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 325, 325-26 (1986). A recent listing of high-speed bulletin
boards distributed electronically by Hayes Microcomputer Products included the Health & Safety
System, run by the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, distributing health information;
ChemNet, run by the University of Akron for the distribution of hazardous chemical information;
MedMug, from the U.S. Army medical base at Fort Devins; LegalEase, a bulletin board for
lawyers in Spokane, Washington; and others directed at lawyers, government computer users, mu-
sicians, or broadcasters, in addition to general and computer-oriented boards. Hayes V-series
[Vol. 22:203
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The smaller systems go up and down literally on an hourly basis,
and no one really knows how many are presently operating. One article
estimated that there were more than 3,500-4,500 such systems availa-
ble to the general public as of late 1985,24 and the number is certainly
larger now. The Videotex Industry. Association recently estimated that
about half a million people in the United States use one or more free
public access bulletin boards.25
B. Access to the Board
Subject to the limitations of the host program, the operator of the
board decides who has access to it. Some boards, such as company bul-
letin boards, are restricted to a few individuals or groups. But many
(probably most) boards are not so limited. They may have completely
open access, that is, they are available to anyone with the necessary
equipment who dials the proper phone number.26 Sometimes access is
limited until the caller leaves a name and telephone number; the opera-
tor may call that number in a simple attempt to verify the user's iden-
tity, and allow greater access only if the verification appears successful.
There may be a one-time or annual charge to use the board.27 Com-
mercial services require users to sign up and provide verifiable billing
information, typically a credit card number. Such commercial services
generally bill their clients a fee depending on how long the client has
used the board or on the particular services obtained.
Smartmodem 9600 Bulletin Board Listing (June 6, 1989) (published electronically, on file at the
Connecticut Law Review).
24. Soma, Smith & Sprague, Legal Analysis of Electronic Bulletin Board Activities. 7 W.
NEw ENG. L. REv. 571, 572 & n.3 (1985) (estimating 3,500-4,500 boards). FidoNet is an infor-
mal network of some 6,000 bulletin boards worldwide. Blankenhorn, The State of the Fido Is
Healthy but Troubled, NEWSBYTES, Sept. 12, 1989 (NEW09120093). A spokesman from Hayes
Microcomputer Products, a major modem manufacturer, on November 9. 1988, tallied 120 boards
running with its new, extremely fast, and relatively expensive 9600-baud modems.
25. Comments of the Videotex Industry Association on the Report and Recommendations of
the United States Concerning the Line of Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating
Companies at 8, United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civ. Action No. 82-0192 (D.D.C.)*(the
Connecticut Law Review was unable to check this citation).
26. Programs exist to automatically dial telephone numbers (randomly, or in a particular se-
quence), to determine whether a computer attached to a modem has answered, and if so, to record
the number for future use. Some hobbyists make extensive use of these programs to locate bulletin
boards, usually late at night when long-distance rates arc cheapest.
27. Typical charges for amateur boards are $10.00 to $25.00; the highest I have heard of was
$50.00.
1989]
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C. Limitations on Use
Not all users have access to all aspects of a board. Invariably, the
operator of the system and his assistants can do many things that ordi-
nary users cannot. In addition, some features of a board may be availa-
ble only to some users. As with limitations on access to the board, the
availability of special features is controlled by the system operator
within the constraints imposed by the host program. Amateur boards
may restrict more sensitive materials to friends of the operator or to
cash contributors. Commercial services often have sections available
only to employees of a particular company or other defined groups,18
and they often charge additional fees for some services, such as the
electronic Official Airline Guide.
Access is limited by a logon sequence. Where security is critical,
logging on may be extremely complicated; 29 more often, it is quite
straightforward. The user dials the board's number30 and when connec-
tion is established gives two pieces of information: his user name
(sometimes a number), which others on the system will use to send him
messages,31 and his private password. The combination of user name
and password is an attempt, not always successful, to insure that third
parties do not leave messages, incur charges, receive mail, and so forth,
in the user's name.32
28. For instance, GEnie (a commercial service run by General Electric) has forums open only
to people who have purchased particular programs. MCI Mail, another commercial service, main-
tains areas open only to people who have been vetted by subscribing companies which use these
areas to distribute confidential information on their products. One "pirate" board, Dragon's Lair,
allowed only those who had "contributed" pirated computer programs to have access to similar
programs "contributed" by others.
29. A user may be required to dial the board, identify himself, and hang up; the board may
then look up his authorized telephone number and call him back at that number, thereby attempt-
ing to insure that anyone who cannot use or tap into one of a limited number of phone lines
cannot get access to the board. More complicated and more secure schemes are possible. Obvi-
ously, there is a continuing war between security and ease of use.
30. Amateur boards most often have a single telephone number. Commercial services can usu-
ally be accessed through nationwide networks providing local telephone numbers in much of the
United States.
31. This may or may not be the user's real name. Most often it is either a number or a
collection of letters chosen by the user. The author, for instance, is 76703,4054 on CompuServe,
D0529 on AppleLink, and LBECKER on MCI Mail.
32. The attempt may be unsuccessful because the user has failed to keep the password confi-
dential, because the system has failed to keep the password confidential, because of an error in the
host program, or because someone has successfully managed to guess another person's password,
Errors in host programs are by no means unknown. Over the last four years, the author has
several times been logged on to one major national service under someone else's identity-after
signing on with his own user name and password.
[Vol. 22:203
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D. The Components of a Bulletin Board
Bulletin boards are typically divided into sections. An amateur's
board may have a few sections, a commercial board hundreds.33 It is no
more possible to characterize them all than it would be to characterize
the organization of periodicals. But typically, the sections operate in
one of a few ways relevant to the present discussion.
1. Public Message Areas
The heart of the system is typically one or more public message
areas, where users may read messages previously posted by others and
may post their own messages (by typing them from a keyboard, or by
otherwise transmitting a message previously prepared and stored).
Commercial services have scores of sections, arranged by topics ranging
from politics, sex, and religion through literary criticism to tropical
fish. The common denominator of these sections is that messages, once
posted, may be read by anyone else with access to the section involved.
Their attractiveness to users is the breadth of the audience and the
speed with which messages are available and answers may be given.'
Messages are typically posted and available for reading immediately,
without additional human intervention. 35
2. Private Mail
Many boards also offer private mail. Users can send messages to
specific individuals, which messages supposedly can be read only by the
person to whom the message is addressed-more precisely, only by
someone gaining access to the system using the name and password of
the person addressed. It is usually true that such "private" mail can
easily be read by the operators of amateur systems, and probably true
that it can be read by the operators of commercial services should they
want to do so.3" But the attractiveness of private mail is obviously its
33. CompuServe, for instance, has more than four hundred sections, some of which have ten
or more subsections.
34. See. e.g., Rittner, Electronic Bulletin Boards Offer 'Round-the-Clock Senices,
MACVEEK, Feb. 23, 1988, at 31, 34.
35. There is no technical reason that this need be so-host programs could be written to delay
posting until the message is approved by the system operator-but delay would decrease the at-
tractiveness of the system and impose a large burden on the operators. For instance, the most
popular of several Macintosh-oriented sections on CompuServe currently receives about 400
messages a day. Many, but not all, operators, however, review messages regularly and occasionally
delete those they find offensive; most large commercial systems review messages at least daily.
36. This is so because any large computer system will regularly be backed up. that is, all the
1989]
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privacy. It is invariably transmitted without any human intervention
from the operator of the board.
3. Conferencing
Boards that can handle many users at one time often have confer-
ence systems, sometimes described as the computerized equivalent of
citizens' band radio. Users go to a conference area of the system where
whatever they type is immediately displayed to all other users in the
section.37  Some conferences are entirely unstructured and consist
mostly of chatter; others are quite formal, rather like a press confer-
ence designed to let users ask questions of a popular or important per-
sonality; and still others are quasi-professional meetings for the discus-
sion of common problems or the creation of common standards. The
messages typed in are viewed by others immediately and typically not
retained for further use or retransmission by the bulletin board. How-
ever, the user of a system typically has the capacity to record anything
he receives and to print it out or otherwise distribute it later.
4. File Areas
Almost every bulletin board system maintains one or more public
file areas to which files may be uploaded (sent) by users and from
which the files may be downloaded (received) by others.3 8 A file is any-
thing readable by a computer. It may be a simple text file, i.e., a
stream of letters, numbers, and punctuation. It may be a formatted
text file, as used by a word processor, containing not only text but also
information on how the text is to be presented (including typeface, par-
agraph indentations, and underlining). It may be a computer program
(commercial or otherwise, copyrighted or not), or a file of information
to be used by a computer program. It may be a graphic image-simple,
information in the system will be stored on magnetic tape or disks so that it can be restored in the
event of a catastrophic failure. Accordingly, even if the system software does not allow the opera-
tor to read "private" mail in the ordinary course of operation, the mail will have been stored on
tape or disk and, with some effort, can be read from there. See, e.g., Brief in Support of Motion to
Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Misc. No. 83-020 (E.D. Mich. filed
July 15, 1983) (responding to motion to quash subpoena for backup tapes containing private mail,
opposing party admitted that private mail on the system at the time the backups were made could,
with some difficulty, be located and read).
37. A system may have many separate conference areas. Some systems also allow a user to
send a brief message to anyone else currently logged on. These messages are displayed immedi-
ately and typically not retained by the system. Unlike messages sent in conference, however, they
are seen only by the addressee.
38. There also may be private file areas for individual users or groups.
[Vol. 22:203
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like the Santa Clauses made of X's and O's, or more complicated, like
digitized photographs.3 9 It may even be a (usually rather primitive)
movie. It may be music or other sounds, again digitized (translated)
into a form that can be processed by a computer. For many users, a
major attraction of computer bulletin boards is the information, partic-
ularly the computer programs, that they can download from the
board's file areas.4 In part because of quite realistic fears that some
users may illegitimately upload copyrighted computer programs, mate-
rial uploaded to files areas on large systems is typically put in a holding
area not available to the public until it has been in some way reviewed
by an agent of the system. 1
III. OPERATORS' LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION
Computer bulletin boards, like any means of communication, can
be used to further unlawful ends. The board is merely the messenger,
and the message can be as varied as human ingenuity. The law histori-
cally has been ambivalent in its treatment of bearers of bad tidings.
Medieval rulers sometimes vented their spleens at unwelcome news on
its bearer. While modern law holds the telephone company wholly
harmless for the phone calls it carries daily,42 those who publish printed
matter have routinely been subject to civil (though never, so far as I
can determine, to criminal)' 3 liability for the contents of advertise-
ments originated by others." Telegraph companies, which have faced
39. The current active state of the art easily allows for computer transmission and receipt of
good line drawings and quite good photographs, better than most photographs printed in daily
newspapers. In theory, however, a graphic image can be of almost any quality.
40. It is not unusual for a single file to be downloaded by several hundred people during the
first day it is posted.
41. Recent concern with potentially dangerous computer programs--computer viruses and
their ilk-is another reason that files are often reviewed.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 581 and comment b (1976). states the tort law rule
(one who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to
liability if he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character, but the telephone company
neither "delivers" nor "transmits" matter within the meaning of the rule). Not surprisingly, I
have been unable to find a criminal prosecution of any American telephone company based on its
transmission of criminal messages. Cf. People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628
(1967) (unsuccessful prosecution of telephone answering service extensively used by prostitutes).
43. Some state criminal libel statutes could apply to paid advertisements, see. e.g., Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (Illinois statute), but I am not aware of any actual prosecu-
tions of publishers for advertising.
44. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (seminal case holding the first
amendment applicable to libel actions, involved an advertisement in The New York Times; Court
did not find it significant that the matter was published as an advertisement).
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criminal prosecution,45 are said to fall in between telephonic and print
message carriers, with a broad but not unlimited immunity from liabil-
ity for the transmission and delivery of messages." The highly regu-
lated radio and television industries have at times been held liable for
information originated by others in which they had only a mechanical
part in the transmission. 7 Where computer bulletin boards should fit in
this patchwork of different rules for different types of carriers is a ques-
tion not yet decided. 8
The "medieval" common-law tort of defamation has not adapted
gracefully to modern times.49 Its outlines, however, are reasonably
clear. A case for defamation was classically made out if the defendant
had "published" a false and defamatory communication 0 about the
45. E.g., Commonwealth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 112 Ky. 355, 67 S.W. 59 (1901) (trans-
mission of apparently innocent messages not criminal); State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 12 N.J.
468, 97 A.2d 480, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 869 (1953) (conviction for maintaining a disorderly
house based on transmission of gambling information).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 612 comment g (1976) (Telegraph companies
are "privileged to accept and transmit an obviously defamatory message, not only when the sender
is in fact privileged to send it, but also when he is not, unless the transmitting agent knows or has
reason to know that the sender is not privileged.").
47. See infra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
48. There are, as yet, no reported cases involving the liability of a bulletin board operator for
disseminating information provided by a user of the board, The closest so far reported are Califor-
nia Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986), a suit about
(among other things) messages posted on a computer bulletin board, as it turned out, by the
operators of the board; and L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1425 (D.
Conn. 1986), where a bankruptcy report was disseminated with the wrong social security number.
In Cohen, however, the social security number had been provided by the person who asked for
(and received) the information.
In the middle of 1986, when a derogatory message about a Connecticut software mail order
house was posted on one California bulletin board, the board was contacted by lawyers from the
mail order house threatening suit if the material was not removed. This author was contacted by
the board for advice. The matter lapsed when the mail order house, under investigation by a state
department of consumer protection, went bankrupt.
49. Criticism is legion. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 771-72 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON], and articles cited supra note 10. If, however, one
thinks of the "law" of defamation as being, in Holmes's words, "what the courts will do in fact,"
O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920) (emphasis added),
it is questionable how many of the odder asserted rules of the law of defamation would be fol-
lowed by a modern court. For example, Prosser and Keeton's statement that defamation law holds
the printer in the print shop where a newspaper is printed liable for a defamatory statement
published in the newspaper is supported by a single case from 1775, and a "cf." citation to an-
other case from 1897. PROSSER & KETON, supra, at 799 n.26. Prosser and Keeton, of course,
recognize that defamation law is changing. See id. at 804-05.
50. "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976).
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plaintiff to a third person.5' In addition, and in part under constitu-
tional compulsion, the law frequently but not invariably now requires
some showing of fault on the part of the plaintiff.5 2 Publication is a
term of art which we will examine later. For the moment, it is sufficient
to define publication as communicating the defamation in circum-
stances where it can reasonably be expected to be understood by others,
and is so understood. 53
Existing law divides those who disseminate defamatory informa-
tion into three categories: primary publishers, secondary publishers,
and "not publishers at all."" Primary publishers-such as magazines
or newspapers, as well as the authors of defamatory articles
therein-are fully liable for defamation. 5 Secondary publishers--such
as bookstores, news dealers, and telegraph companies-typically are
said have a qualified privilege, and are liable only if they know or have
reason to know of the defamatory character of the information they are
transmitting.5" Still others, such as the telephone company, may pass
information along but are not said to have published it and thus are not
liable at all.5" The question is where bulletin boards fit into this
scheme. Since the reasons, other than history, for the current classifica-
51. In addition, the publication must have been without "privilege," and unless the defama-
tory statement was of a kind actionable irrespective of special harm, the plaintiff must show actual
damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976). 1 am not here concerned with the
allocation of burdens of pleading and proof.
52. See infra section IV.
53. There is no defamation unless some person other than the defendant and the one defamed
becomes aware of the communication, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 comment d and
illustration 2 (1976), although this element may be satisfied by a showing that the communication
was made in circumstances where others probably understood it. Gaudette v. Carter, 100 R.I. 259.
214 A.2d 197 (1965). And there is no defamation if the defendant did not and could not reasona-
bly have expected others to become aware of the communication, as in the case of private letters
opened by a third party. See. e.g., Barnes v. Clayton House Motel, 435 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968).
54. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49, at 803 (labeling the third category "suppliers of
equipment and facilities" who "are not publishers at all").
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 comment c (1976). By "fully liable" I mean
only that they are liable as if they had originated the statement, and not that they are necessarily
liable without some kind of negligence regarding the truth or falsity of the statement (although
the common law rule is often said to have imposed strict liability). See id. at § 580B comment b
(where the act in issue is publication of a communication to a third party, "the common law of
defamation has consistently required negligence or other fault for liability to be imposed").
56. E.g., Hartmann v. American News Co., 171 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1948) (magazine distribu-
tor), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Church of Scientology v. Minnesota Medical Ass'n, 264
N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 1978) (association distributing clippings and articles on request); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1976).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 comment b (1976).
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tions are not at all evident, the position of bulletin boards is far from
clear.
Navigation in these waters is rendered even more treacherous by
the uncertain applicability of the first amendment. Since New York
Times v. Sullivan58 held that amendment applicable to defamation
cases under state law, no chart would be complete without including it.
But new technology has made the location of that "fixed star in our
constitutional constellation" 59 less certain and its brilliance more varia-
ble; it may or may not shine brightly on computer bulletin boards.°0
Hence, I shall deal first with defamation law as it developed with the
first amendment in eclipse, and then consider the extent to which dif-
ferent results are permitted (or compelled) by the constitutional protec-
tion of free speech and press.
I begin with the assumption that a user of a computer bulletin
board has received through that board information posted by a third
party which defames someone else, and that the person defamed could
recover damages from the person who posted it. The question I address
is in what circumstances the bulletin board operator is also liable.
A. What is "Published"
Alice, a user of a computer bulletin board, logs on to the board
and transmits information defaming Barbara. The information is stored
electronically and automatically by the "host" program controlling the
board's computer. Thereafter, without human intervention on behalf of
the bulletin board,"' Carol logs onto the board and receives the infor-
mation. There is no question that distribution of information by com-
puter can sometimes be a publication, 62 and that the person who pro-
vides the information for access by the person who gets it63 publishes
58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
59. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (Jackson, J.).
60. See infra section IV.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
62. E.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); California
Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986). In both cases,
the point was assumed and not challenged or discussed. See generally Stevens & Hoffman, Tort
Liability for Defamation by Computer, 6 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 91, 93 (1977).
63. Only if the sender could have reasonably expected that the message would be communi-
cated to someone who would have an actionable claim against him, would he be deemed to have
"published" it to the third party under existing law. This would occur, for instance, where a third
party has read defamatory electronic mail sent to the subject of the defamation or a vandal gains
access to private files. See supra note 53.
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it." The question is whether the bulletin board operator publishes it as
well.
Two analogies suggest that the operator may not have published
the defamation. An engaging line of cases, dealing with the liability of
physical bulletin board owners for defamatory material posted by
others,65 would hold at least that there is no publication unless the op-
erator, knowing of the defamatory material, thereafter fails to remove
it. The doctrine that one who merely provides "facilities and equip-
ment" for the dissemination of defamation has not "published" it
should apply to at least some kinds of transmissions by computer bulle-
tin boards.
1. Bulletin Board Cases
A handful of litigated cases have involved the liability of property
owners for defamatory materials put on their property by someone else.
Those cases view the critical question as that of publication, and typi-
cally hold that the owner who knows of the defamatory statement, and
fails or refuses to remove it after a reasonable amount of time, is liable
either for "publishing" the statement or for "ratifying" its publica-
tion. 6 Thus, the property owner, by inaction, accepts responsibility for
64. Since all of the existing cases of defamation by computer involve information supplied by
an agent of the system's operator, it would be possible to argue that they arc finding the operator
liable not because it provided the information with the intention that it be communicated to
others, but only because it made the actual physical transmission. Thus, he who provides the
libelous information would be treated as guiltless, while the bulletin board would be liable. This
would be like holding the news vendor but not the author of a defamatory article liable, and one
can assume that courts will not reach such an absurd result.
65. More precisely, they discuss the liability of those in control of property for messages
placed on that property by others. There are, in all, five American cases, only three of which date
from this century, and only one of which was decided within the past quarter of a century. See
infra note 66.
66. E.g., Tidmore v. Mills, 33 Ala. App. 243, 32 So. 2d 769, certfication denied, 249 Ala.
648, 32 So. 2d 782 (1947) (in case involving sign on defendant's property accusing others of
mistreating the defendant, jury could find ratification from failure to remove); Hellar v. Bianco,
III Cal. App. 2d 424, 244 P.2d 757 (1952) (where defamatory words appeared on men's room
wall in bar, there was jury question whether the bartender's knowing failure to remove, after
notice and demand, amounted to a publication when the offiended party's husband went with
others to view the notice); Fogg v. Boston & L.R.R., 148 Mass. 513, 20 N.E. 109 (1889) (from
fact that article was on railroad's bulletin board for 40 days, jury could "presume" it had been
made with railroad's authority or that posting had subsequently been ratified); Woodling v. Knick-
erbocker, 31 Minn. 268, 17 N.W. 387, 388 (1883) (in case involving defamatory signs on a table
outside defendant's shop, if "having authority to remove them, he allowed them to remain, the act
[of publication] was his"); Scott v. Hull, 22 Ohio App. 2d 141, 259 N.E.2d 160 (1970) (in case
involving defamatory graffiti on outside of building, mere failure to remove was not "ratification"
or publication); Byrne v. Deane, I K.B. 818 (1937) (dictum; posted poem held not actionable).
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its previous publication of the material by someone else.
When closely examined, however, these cases are less authoritative
than they may seem, even though their rationale has been adopted by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.67 At least two, and perhaps four, of
the six cases arose in circumstances making it quite likely that the
property owner or his agents had actually posted the defamatory mate-
rial.68 One of the cases involved a posting the court found not defama-
tory, and thus the discussion whether the owner would be liable if the
material were defamatory is clearly dictum." And the only two Ameri-
can cases in the last thirty-seven years reach different and arguably
opposite results: one held that a bar owner could be liable for failing to
remove defamatory remarks from the men's room after being informed
of them by the injured party's angry husband (who promptly collected
a group of friends to go and view the offensive language),70 while the
other found the owner of a building not liable for failing to remove
defamatory graffiti on an outside wall. 1 Nevertheless, the cases are
consistent in their insistence that there is no publication without knowl-
edge of the material's existence-a thread, as I argue below, that runs
almost without exception through the whole of defamation law.
2. Mere Suppliers
A second line-more doctrine than cases-also supports an argu-
ment that not everything distributed by a computer bulletin board is
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1976) ("[olne who intentionally and
unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited on land or chattels
in his possession or under his control is subject to liability for its continued publication"); see also
id. at comment p ("the duty arises only when the defendant knows that the defamatory matter is
being exhibited on his land or chattels").
68. The clear cases are Tidmore v. Mills, 33 Ala. App. 243, 32 So. 2d 769, certification de-
nied, 249 Ala. 648, 32 So. 2d 782 (1947) (sign on defendant's property accusing others of mis-
treating the defendant), and Woodling v. Knickerbocker, 31 Minn. 268, 17 N.W. 387 (1883)
(defamatory signs on a table outside defendant's shop accusing a customer of not paying for mer-
chandise). The possible ones are Fogg v. Boston & L.R. Co., 148 Mass. 513, 20 N.E. 109 (1889)
(evidence would authorize finding that posting on railroad ticket agent's bulletin board was with
the railroad's authority), and Byrne v. Deane, 1 K.B. 818 (1937) (poem accusing club member of
reporting illegal club gambling to the police).
69. Byrne v. Deane, 1 K.B. 818 (1937).
70. Hellar v. Bianco, 111 Cal. App. 2d 424, 244 P.2d 757 (1952) (sufficient evidence to go to
jury on the question of publication).
71. Scott v. Hull, 22 Ohio App. 2d 141, 259 N.E.2d 160 (1970). The court in Scott distin-
guished Hellar v. Bianco, arguing that bars "invited" people to go to their bathrooms (and read
the walls?), while a building owner does not invite the public to look at its exterior and ponder the
graffiti. Id. at 142, 259 N.E.2d at 161.
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published by the operator of the board. According to the Second Re-
statement, the rule is that "one who merely makes available to another
equipment or facilities that he may use himself for general communica-
tion purposes" is not liable for publication,72 even if the supplier knows
or has reason to know the equipment will be used to disseminate de-
famatory information. In other words, IBM is not liable even if it
knowingly sells a typewriter to The National Inquirer, and a telephone
company is not liable for its subscribers' slanderous phone calls. How-
ever, this doctrine, although plausible and supported by the American
Law Institute and other commentators, has been tested in only a single
case. 7 3 In Anderson v. New York Telephone Co.,74 the New York
Court of Appeals unanimously held the telephone company had not
"published" a series of four defamatory tape recordings sent over tele-
phone lines by a subscriber, even though the company had been in-
formed of the messages by the offended party and could have removed
its leased recorded-message equipment without disrupting the sub-
scriber's ordinary phone service."
Even assuming Anderson was correctly decided on its facts, the
operators of computer bulletin boards should not always be held mere
suppliers of facilities and equipment, and thus not publishers of the
information they transmit. To be sure, in a sense they are just renting
out their equipment for the use of others, like the telephone com-
pany-or even providing it for free, in the case of many boards. Still,
they sometimes exert substantial control over the material disseminated
in public areas of the board.7 6 At least two features distinguish public
messages and files from defamatory material transmitted by the tele-
phone company. First, the originator of the material transmitted by
telephone retains control over its transmission. By contrast, once mate-
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 581 comment b (1976). Accord, PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 49, at 804.
73. The virtually complete absence of litigation may indicate the strength, not the weakness.
of the doctrine. But it makes it difficult to determine its bounds.
74. 35 N.Y.2d 746, 320 N.E.2d 647, 361 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1974). rer'g 42 A.D.2d 151, 345
N.Y.S.2d 740 (1973).
75. See Anderson, 42 A.D.2d 151, 157, 345 N.Y.S.2d 740. 747 (Appellate Division opinion).
The Court of Appeals merely reversed on the reasoning of the dissenting opinion in the Appdllate
Division. See id. at 161-72, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 750-60 (Witmer, J., dissenting).
76. See supra note 35. Indeed, several major public services (CompuServe, Delphi, and GE-
nie) claim their work in deciding what should be made available in the public files areas is suffi-
cient to give them a "compilation copyright" in the collection of material. See. e.g., CompuServe
Statement of Compilation Copyright Policy, CompuServe Information Service, RUL-5 (as of Jan.
26, 1990).
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rial has been transmitted to a computer bulletin board, its further
transmission is beyond the originator's control; dissemination is wholly
in the hands of the board and its operator." Second, where defamation
is repeatedly transmitted by telephone, as in Anderson, the originator
can be traced, and at least sued for damages if not enjoined.7 8 But it
may be impossible to trace the originator of defamatory material on a
bulletin board: the poster may have signed on anonymously, 0 may have
used another person's identity without authorization or the possibility
of tracing,80 or may even have died while his message lingers behind. A
bulletin board's potential, and frequently its actual control over the files
and messages in its public areas warrants the conclusion that those
messages are published by the board when it transmits them to users.81
Electronic mail, conferences, and real-time chatter are quite an-
other matter. Like the ordinary telephone call,82 those messages are
transmitted only once, without human intervention on the part of the
board.8 3 Of course the sender may be anonymous, 8' but so may a tele-
77. Contrast repeated messages sent by a phone company subscriber: each phone call is a
single transmission, and each transmission is in the control of the subscriber. In the case of bulle-
tin boards, once the material is under the board's control, the originator cannot even erase it
without the board's cooperation. In fact, ordinary practice is for the host program to allow an
individual to delete public messages he originated immediately, but to require requests for file
deletion to be acted upon by the system operator.
78. It is doubtful whether an injunction would lie, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (Minnesota statute authorizing suppression of publication where publisher
has "conducted a business of publishing . . . defamatory matter" is inconsistent with constitu-
tional guarantees of freedom of the press), although arguably that rule would not apply to an
injunction against repetitions of the same defamatory words. It is of course true that an anony-
mous caller could move from pay phone to pay phone, calling other people and repeating defama-
tory statements over and over again. But any such action would be far less effective (and thus less
likely) than using a single number and a recorded message, thereby allowing the curious to call.
79. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 32.
81. A finding that defamatory material has been published by the bulletin board does not, of
course, close the question of whether the operator is liable for the publication. See infra notes 88-
112 and accompanying text.
82. And unlike a telegram, at least as telegrams were sent in the days when defamation cases
were brought against telegraph companies.
83. Bulletin board host programs could be written so that no mail was sent before it had been
read by the board operator. It appears that the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701 to -10 (1988) would permit this, since § 2702(b)(4) authorizes disclosure of communica-
tions "to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used to forward such communi-
cation to its destination," and § 2702(b)(5) authorizes disclosure "as may be necessarily incident
to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
service." However, it is unlikely that users would want to send private mail so scrutinized, More-
over, the cost of scrutiny--especially prompt scrutiny-would be substantial.
Similarly, although real-time chatter could be censored before it was transmitted, the cost
[Vol. 22:203
COMPUTER BULLETIN BOARD DEFAMATION
phone caller."5 When acting only in these ways, a computer bulletin
board really is doing no more than providing facilities for the use of
others, and should no more be held a publisher of the material trans-
mitted than the telephone company is.86
This distinction is strengthened by the bulletin board cases, which
invariably require knowledge of the defamatory material before the
board owner is found to have published it.87 It is possible to argue even
further that the board operator should not be considered a "publisher"
even of material in public message and file areas until it knows what
material is there. Although the result may be appealing (and I will
urge something very much like that below), this argument goes too far
as a matter of syntax. A computer bulletin board, offering public
messages to a wide audience, is more like a radio or television broad-
caster than it is like a telephone company. A better rule would be that
the board has published whatever is generally available to its users, and
treat its liability for that publication as a separate question.
B. Liability for What is Published
It is often said that those who disseminate defamatory material
are liable for its distribution either as primary or as secondary publish-
ers, the main difference being that (except in recent years, and under
constitutional prodding, if not always compulsion) a primary publisher
is liable for the defamation regardless of his fault in publishing it,
whereas a secondary publisher is liable only if he knew or should have
known of the defamatory character of what he was publishing.88 I am
would be great and the loss of immediacy would no doubt kill the genre.
84. This is either because the board permits anonymity, or by misuse of another's
identification.
85. The Resiatement's (Second) discussion of the telephone company explicitly includes pay
telephones that may be used by anyone. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 comment b. at
232 (1976).
86. For the same reason, when computer bulletin boards with different owners are connected
into a network, intermediate boards on the network which do nothing but pass information along
should also not be held to have published the information transmitted.
87. One might "return to Year Book distinctions between fasance and nonfeasance," Lam-
bert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and deny the applicabil-
ity of these cases since the computer bulletin board is, however automatically, acting affirmatively
to send the information out. Such an argument, however, does not line up with the cases. For
example, the offended husband in Hellar v. Bianco, Ill Cal. App. 2d 424, 244 P.2d 757 (1952),
did not bring his own candles to view the message in the men's room, but relied on light provided
(at some cost) by the bar. Moreover, telephone companies provide very sophisticated services in-
deed when they transmit the phone calls which the law says they do not publish.
88. In addition, even a secondary publisher who knows it is distributing defamatory material
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not sure the cases support the statements; indeed, I have been able to
find only a single case clearly holding a primary publisher liable for
defamation in the absence of some colorable fault. In any event, there
are at least differences in the ways the cases treat newspapers, radio
and television broadcasters, and other distributors (news agents, tele-
graph companies, and so forth) of defamatory material. Intelligent con-
sideration of the treatment of computer bulletin boards should begin
with a canvass of these cases.
1. The Print Media
Newspapers and other ordinary publishers of printed matter have
routinely been held to account for what they publish, whether the
words were written by their agents or are advertisements or letters to
the editor prepared by others.89 This rule has sometimes been consid-
ered to do away with the requirement of knowledge of what is being
published, 90 but it should not. Everything that goes into a book, news-
paper, or magazine is "known" to some agent of the publisher, 1 who is
thus vicariously chargeable with that knowledge. 92 Although the cases
are replete with quotation of Lord Mansfield's statement that
will not be liable unless it knew or had reason to know that the person on whose behalf it was
distributing it was not privileged to make the communication. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 612 (1976).
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(l) (1976); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
49, at 803, 810. It is interesting to note that none of the Restatement's (Second) examples involve
the publication of advertisements or letters to the editor, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 577A, illustrations 3, 5-8; id. at § 578, illustrations 1, 2, but the cases do not appear to
make such a distinction. See, e.g., Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936)
(advertisement); Safarets, Inc. v. Gannett Co., 80 Misc. 2d 109, 361 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (letter to the editor decrying conditions in pet shop), affd, 49 A.D.2d 666, 373 N.Y.S.2d
858 (1975).
90. E.g., Leflar, Radio and TV Defamation: "Fault" or Strict Liability?, 15 O111o ST. L.J
252, 2.3-54 (1954).
91. At least, this has been the case under traditional methods of publication where the words
are set into type by a printer, whether setting type by hand (as Ben Franklin did), by Linotype, or
by a more modern electronic typesetter. Recent developments in electronic publishing have made
it feasible for a periodical, for instance, to use a computer to publish advertisements never seen by
any agent or employee of the paper. As far as I know, however, no periodicals allow such a
practice, and certainly no such cases involving such a practice have been litigated. Cf. D. ADAMS,
DIRK GENTLY'S HOLISTIC DETECTIVE AGENCY (1987) (work of fiction published by Simon &
Schuster-and, in fact, presumably read by the editors there-but set in type entirely by the
author); N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1987, at Al, col. 3 (discussing the growing electronic publishing
industry).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 comment f (1976) (liability for publication
by one's agent); cf. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 49, at 810.
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"[w]henever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril, 9 3 the unstated
assumption seems always to be that the publisher or one of his agents
knows what he is publishing. 4 There simply are no reported cases to
establish the contrary where a prankish third party crept into the print
shop and inserted a libel into an otherwise innocuous publication after
it was proofread. Accordingly, the print cases should not be taken as
establishing the principle that a publisher is liable for publishing some-
thing he does not know he is publishing, but only as recognizing the
fact that there is always present in these cases an equivalent of the
opportunity to remove the offending material that the bulletin board
cases require. Even if the print cases are the appropriate analogy, a
computer bulletin board should be liable for transmitting defamatory
information only if it continued to make the information available after
it became aware the specific material was being transmitted."
2. Broadcast Media
As with those who publish printed material, it seems always to
have been assumed that a broadcaster through whose facilities defama-
tory information has been broadcast is a publisher of that informa-
tion. 96 Like newspapers and book publishers, radio and television
broadcasters have physical (and usually legal)97 control over what they
93. The King v. Woodfall, 98 Eng. Rep. 914, 916 (1774); see also. e.g.. Peck v. Tribune Co,
214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909) (Holmes, J.).
94. Justice Holmes's language in Peck, 214 U.S. at 189, makes precisely this point. After
quoting the cited words of Lord Mansfield, he explains them by saying,
The reason is plain. A libel is harmful on its face. Ira man sees fit to publish manifestly
hurtful statements concerning an individual, without other justification than exists for an
advertisement or piece of news, the usual principles of tort will make him liable, if the
statements are false or are true only of someone else.
Id. (emphasis added).
95. Of course there is a sense in which the board-or more precisely, its host program-is
"aware" of the material the instant it is transmitted. Future developments in artificial intelligence
may make it possible to write bulletin board programs with a reasonable degree of common sense.
For now, however, the required awareness should be that of some human being in the board
operator's employ. Compare Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for User Misuse.
54 FORDHAm L. REv. 439, 449-50 (1985) for consideration and rejection of a rule that would
require host programs to be written so as not to accept messages containing "objectionable"
language.
96. E.g., Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934).
97. With some exceptions, broadcasters are required by the Communications Act Amend-
ments, 1952, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982), to provide reply time to other legally qualified candi-
dates if they give broadcast time to one candidate. In addition, the FCC in the past has imposed
various affirmative obligations on broadcasters, including some programming for children. 47
C.F.R. § 73.4050 (1984), and reasonable access by candidates for public office. 47 C.F.R. §
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broadcast. But although broadcasters may control who gets within
range of the microphone, they can not always control what those in
range may say. And although "delay systems," devices that impose
some delay between words and actions and their ultimate broadcast,
have been technologically feasible for decades, they are often not
used.98 Accordingly, unlike the print cases, some broadcast defamation
cases squarely raise the question of a broadcaster's liability for defama-
tory statements it did not know would be broadcast. 9
The cases answer the question in two directly opposite ways.100
One line holds broadcasters liable 01 although they did not know (and
73.1940. The District of Columbia Circuit has held that most of the existing rules are not required
by statute, Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987), and the FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine in 1987.
Syracuse Peace Council v. WTNH, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043 (1987). The same day it rejected proposed
alternatives to the doctrine. See Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations Concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligation of Broadcast
Licensees, 2 FCC Rcd. 5272 (1987), recon. denied, 3 FCC Rcd. 2050 (1988). It is generally
accepted that equivalent controls would be unconstitutional if applied to the print media. Miami
Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (unanimous decision striking down right-of-
reply statute applied to a newspaper; Justices Brennan and Rehnquist expressly reserved the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of state law "retraction" statutes requiring publication if plaintiff can
prove defamatory falsehood).
98. Devices that simply impose a small delay can be relatively expensive for small stations.
See Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp., 251 So. 2d 405 (La. App.) (radio station), appli-
cation denied, 259 La. 885, 253 So. 2d 217 (1971). Of course, a radio station could tape all its
broadcasts and play the tapes later if nothing untoward was said, and television stations could do
the same; even commercial-quality tape and videotape recorders are relatively inexpensive, and
most stations probably have them anyway. But many viewers and listeners would miss the excite-
ment of live coverage even if the delay was short.
99. In one small area, the question is governed by federal nonconstitutional law. Where the
Communications Act requires broadcasters to provide time to political candidates and forbids
them from censoring the remarks, they cannot as a matter of federal law be held liable for any
defamation the politician chooses to emit. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc,, 360
U.S. 525 (1959). For a discussion of how the first amendment may affect the question, see Infra
Section IV.
100. The commentators likewise are split. Those favoring liability without knowledge included
Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 249 (1940); Donnelly,
Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 IOWA L. REv. 12 (1948); Remmers, Recent Legisla-
tive Trends in Defamation by Radio, 64 HARV. L. REv. 727, 756 (1951); Leflar, supra note 90
(arguing primarily on the grounds that stations can and should obtain liability insurance). Major
opponents include Sprague, Freedom of the Air, 8 AIR L. REV. 30 (1937); Farnum, Radio Defa-
mation and the American Law Institute, 16 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1936); and Seitz, Responsibility of
Radio Stations for Extemporaneous Defamation, 24 MARQ. L. REv. 117 (1940). Since the 1950s,
statutory and constitutional developments have muted the debate. See supra note 99; infra section
IV.
101. Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932) (speech delivered by politician
given air time under compulsion of the Communications Act), appeal dismissed sub nom, KFAB
Broadcasting Co. v. Wood, 290 U.S. 599 (1933); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20
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in at least one of the cases could not have known 02) that the defama-
tory statements were to be broadcast. These cases typically assert that
print media are liable if they knew about the defamatory material, 0 3
and argue it would be "unfair" to give greater protection to their radio
competitors.1 04 A second line, slightly later in appearance, holds broad-
casters liable for what they did not know would be broadcast only if
they were at fault in failing to find out.1 °5 The first and leading case,
Summit Hotel v. National Broadcasting Co.,108 denied that the print
media were liable without fault in Pennsylvania, 0 7 and rejected any
analogy to ordinary printed matter where someone not under the
broadcaster's control made the defamatory statement.10 8 The court
opted instead for a negligence standard.10 9 Two other cases give few
reasons for their conclusions.110
P.2d 847 (1933); Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934) ("sudden
utterance" of defamatory words by person of good reputation speaking from an unexceptionable
script). The specific result in Sorenson is now forbidden by Farmers Educational, 360 US. 525
(1959).
102. Coffey, 8 F. Supp. at 890.
103. This is an assertion I believe is wrong. See the discussion of print media cases, supra
notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
104. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 890 (D. Mo. 1934); Sorenson v.
wood, 123 Neb. 348, 357, 243 N.W. 82, 86 (1932), appeal dismissed sub nom. KFAB Broad-
casting Co. v. Wood, 290 U.S. 599 (1933); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466. 472-73,
20 P.2d 847, 849-50 (1933); see also Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 67, 74 P.2d 1127, 1130
(1938) ("difficult to see any difference in principle between radio broadcasting of court proceed-
ings and the publication of the same in newspapers"; result is nonliability for broadcast of defa-
mation occurring in the course of broadcast trial).
105. Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948) (facilities rented to defamer);
Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (Sup. Ct.
1942) (case involving political candidate; issue resolved in one sentence); Summit Hotel Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939) (Al Jolson ad-libbed, "It's a rotten
hotel.").
106. 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
107. Id. at 192, 8 A.2d at 307. The court's view of Pennsylvania defamation law is very close
to the view that I have urged accurately represents defamation law in general.
108. Id. at 193-96, 8 A.2d at 307-09, 311. The court also rejected other asserted analogies. Id.
at 196-98, 8 A.2d at 309-11.
109. The court viewed negligence as the norm except in the special case of damages to land.
Id. (semble).
110. Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986
(Sup. Ct. 1942), merely asserts, without discussion, that the "physical aspects of radio broadcast-
ing warrant" a negligence standard. The court may or may not have been referring to the fact
that the print media have the opportunity to review what is printed before it is disseminated. And
although the court in Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948), engaged in more
extended discussion, in the end it merely quoted Professor Bohlen's statement that "justice would
be done and the good reputation of mankind given sufficient protection" by a negligence rule. Id.
at 701, 61 A.2d at 147 (quoting Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARv, L REv 725, 731
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Under the influence of legislation111 and constitutional considera-
tions, the second line has clearly prevailed for more than a generation;
there have been no reported cases holding a broadcaster liable for a
third party's statement, in the absence of fault for fifty years. This does
not, however, mean that the fault line would or should prevail when
computer bulletin boards are involved. Specific legislation directed at
the perceived special problems of broadcasting is not applicable to com-
puter bulletin boards, 1 2 and the applicability of first amendment prin-
ciples developed in other contexts is not clear. The broadcast cases, if
applicable to computer bulletin boards, could support either result.
3. Secondary Publishers
It is regularly said that a secondary publisher-one who only "de-
livers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person"-is
liable only if he knows or has reason to know of the defamatory charac-
ter of what he is transmitting. 1 In this category are placed the sellers
and distributors of books and magazines,"14 libraries,"" and telegraph
companies.1 6 In fact, the cases are not as quick to impose liability as
(1937)).
111. By 1954, 32 states had enacted statutes which governed, at least in part, the liability of
broadcasters for defamatory information they broadcast. Leflar, supra note 90, at 267-71. The
current tally, by my count, is 40. Twelve of these statutes establish rules requiring some degree of
fault for broadcasts compelled by law or statements by political candidates, but are silent on the
general question of third-party defamation. See, e.g., MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-503
(1986) (no liability if political speech cannot be censored); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN, ch. 231, § 91A
(West 1987) (same as Maryland law); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-811 (1988) (proof of actual
malice required if broadcast is on important controversial topic). The remainder require proof of
fault before a broadcaster can be held liable for defamatory statements by a third party. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.5 (West 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-712 (Harrison 1984); MISS, CODE
ANN. § 95-1-5 (1987) (no liability for third-party statements); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507-A:1
to :3 (1983) (no liability without lack of due care; no liability at all for uncontrolled network
broadcasts).
112. There is some state legislation regulating computer bulletin boards, but it is criminal
legislation dealing with the disclosure of credit card and similar information, see, e.g., CAL, PENAL
CODE § 484j (West 1988) (misdemeanor to publish credit card and other codes with intent to
defraud, specifically including publication by "computer network or computer bulletin board"), or
unauthorized access to computer systems, see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.89 (West 1987). A
general survey of such statutes appears in Soma, Smith & Sprague, Legal Analysis of Electronic
Bulletin Board Activities, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 571, 577-603 (1985).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1976). The Restatement (Second), how-
ever, makes a special exception for radio and television broadcasters, who are liable as original
publishers. Id. at § 581(2) and comment g.
114. Id. at § 581(1) comments d and e.
115. Id. comment e.
116. Id. comment f.
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the Second Restatement and hornbooks, for although they do contain
statements supporting this rule, there are few if any cases actually find-
ing liability. For instance, no one seems to have sued a library for defa-
mation in this century;117 no American appears ever to have recovered
for defamation from a bookseller or distributor not controlled by the
primary publisher; even the telegraph company has had remarkable
success in litigation against it.118 Statements about when such second-
ary publishers are liable are almost entirely dicta; the holdings, with
few exceptions, deal with when they are not liable. At most, if these
cases were applicable, they would hold computer bulletin boards liable
only if they knew or had reason to know what they were transmitting.
Moreover, notwithstanding repeated dicta, they may in fact argue for
even less liability.
C. Applying the Cases
It often may be unnecessary to resolve the question whether a
computer bulletin board operator, with regard to messages in its public
message and file areas, is a primary publisher like the print and broad-
cast media, or a secondary publisher like newsdealers and libraries.
Only a single line of cases (the Snowden line of broadcast defamation
cases)119 suggests that even a primary publisher can be held liable for
117. The closest thing I have been able to find is LaMons v. City of Vestport 44 Wash. App.
664, 723 P.2d 470 (1986). The LaMonses had sued city police officers on constitutional grounds;
when the city paid part of its officers' litigation expenses, it placed the case file in the public
library so that interested citizens could read it and find out how their money was being spent. The
LaMonses, claiming material in the file was defamatory, promptly sued the city (but not the
library) for defamation. The city obtained summary judgment on a showing, disappointing for
proponents of democratic government, that nobody had ever troubled to read the file.
118. Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 65 Minn. 18, 67 N.W. 646 (1896) ("Slippery Sam,
your name is pants."), may be the only reported case in which a plaintiff prevailed. Even then, it
took Sam four trials to collect his $1000 judgment. See Peterson v. Vestern Union Tel. Co., 75
Minn. 368, 77 N.W. 985 (1899). Speaking through Judge Magruder. the First Circuit in 1940
expressed some doubt as to whether the telegraph company could ever be held liable for defama-
tory messages it transmitted. O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 542 (1st Cir.
1940). The other cases typically cited do not involve ultimate victories for the plaintiffs. See
Lesesne v. Willingham, 83 F. Supp. 918 (E.D.S.C. 1949) (complaint survived motion to dismiss;
no record whether plaintiff ultimately prevailed); Nye v. Western Union Tel. Co., 104 F. 628
(C.C.D. Minn. 1900) (verdict should have been directed for the company); Stockham v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 10 Kan. App. 580, 63 P. 658 (1900) (company's demurrer to the evidence sus-
tained); Grisham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 238 Mo. 480, 142 S.W. 271 (1911) (directed verdict
for company affirmed).
119. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. Professor Leflar, who took a similar
position, rested his argument on the commercial nature of broadcasting and the availability of
low-cost insurance to spread the risk of defamation. Leflar, supra note 90, at 265-67. It is possible
19891
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
publishing defamatory material unless it knows what it is publishing.
And that line of cases is explicitly based on an asserted parity with
publishers of printed materials-an assertion that, I have argued, mis-
understands the print cases.120 Therefore, all of the cases reviewed sup-
port the position that the operator of a computer bulletin board should
not be liable for defamatory materials distributed through public mes-
sage or files sections until the operator is actually aware that the defa-
mation is available for distribution.
This does not, however, end the matter; the cases do differ in their
treatment of the publisher who knows the words or pictures he is pub-
lishing, but is unaware of their defamatory import or believes they are
(or may be) true. At least until the constitutional revolution, the print
cases held such a publisher liable; the broadcast cases appear to split
between a holding of liability and a holding that liability will attach
only if the broadcaster was negligent;121 and the secondary publisher
cases appear to require a high degree of fault indeed.
For these purposes, computer bulletin board operators should be
treated as secondary publishers, like news vendors, libraries, and tele-
graph companies. The print media typically employ extensive editorial,
copy editing, and proofreading staffs; what is published in books,
magazines, and even the daily newspaper is regularly read and reread
by several-sometimes even dozens-of people before publication takes
place. The same is often, though by no means always, true of radio and
television broadcasts; even on live broadcasts, most of what is broadcast
is spoken by employees or agents of the broadcaster. By contrast, the
essence of public messages and open files on a computer bulletin board
is not the presentation of the ideas of a few to the many, but the partic-
ipation of many in the interchange of ideas, opinions, and information.
They are perhaps most like communication by telegraph, with an ex-
panded audience. The operator may give some direction and control by
but by no means certain that such insurance would be cheap (or available at all) for bulletin
board operators today, when the newspapers are full of stories decrying rising insurance rates.
Even if it is, however, the majority of bulletin boards are not commercial operations.
120. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
121. I say "appear" because in all of the reported cases, the defamatory character of the
broadcast words was apparent on their face; none of the broadcast cases thus squarely raises the
question of liability for apparently innocent, but actually defamatory, comments or pictures. How-
ever, the no-fault line, depending as it does on a desire for parity between the print and broadcast
media, see supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text, would presumably follow the print rule.
The Summit Hotel line, ultimately based on the notion that negligence should be the general
standard in the absence of overwhelming reason to the contrary, presumably would require negli-
gence with regard to this aspect as well. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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directing the general topics to be discussed, and even by deleting an
occasional message or file. But this degree of control is nothing like the
control a radio broadcaster exercises over program content. Although
nothing (except, perhaps, user disinterest) would stop a computer bulle-
tin board from controlling operating in this manner, for the law to do
so would cut to the very heart of what the users find attractive about
the boards.122
Taken as far as they might be carried, these considerations could
lead one to argue for complete immunity from liability for computer
bulletin boards. But as noted above in connection with the discussion of
"publication,"' 2 3 there are countervailing considerations, particularly
the fact that once information is posted on a bulletin board, it is not
only out of the hands but also out of the control of the original dissem-
inator. Complete immunity would mean that the posted information
could remain in circulation indefinitely-particularly if the source of
the information could never be found. Allowing liability only for con-
tinued dissemination after the disseminating bulletin board operator
has knowledge of the defamatory character of the material is a reason-
able balance of the competing interests.
The argument above, if accepted, would also resolve the additional
question whether the operator of a bulletin board must actively police
the public areas of the board in order to find out what is being distrib-
uted through its facilities, or whether it is liable only when it has actual
knowledge (or, at the least, good reason to know) that it is distributing
defamatory material. The law is clear that secondary publishers are not
required to investigate the contents of what they are distributing in or-
der to avoid liability.124
There are good policy reasons for such a result. Although practice
on the large commercial boards is often (but no means invariably) to
preview files and review public messages, turning general practice into
legal obligation would impose a considerable onus. The burden on small
private boards, which are often volunteer services and sometimes oper-
122. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
124. E.g., Sexton v. American News Co., 133 F. Supp. 591 (N.D. Fla. 1955) (magazine dis-
tributor); Church of Scientology v. Minnesota Medical Ass'n, 264 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 1978)
(medical association passing out clippings on request). Telegraph companies, of course, tradition-
ally had to read the words before they could transmit them. Even then, they were not responsible
for making additional investigation to determine their defamatory character. See, e.g., Nye v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 104 F. 628 (C.C.D. Minn. 1900) (telegram that plaintiff had been
"bought off" could have referred to commercial sale and not to corruption; no duty to investigate).
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ate without intervention for days or weeks at a time, would be espe-
cially harsh. 125 Should future developments show that failure to impose
such a duty is causing serious hardship, the question might well be re-
considered, either by a legislature or by the courts. But until such a
time, the rule for secondary publishers should apply to computer bulle-
tin boards as well.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I have argued in Section III that computer bulletin boards should
not be liable at all for defamatory material transmitted privately, as by
electronic mail, or conveyed in one-time transmissions like on-line con-
ferences or real-time messages. In those circumstances they are not the
publishers of the defamation but merely its transmitters, like a tele-
phone company. I have also argued that information available for mul-
tiple transmission, such as that in public message and file areas, has
been "published" by the board and its operators. Such bulletin board
systems are best treated in the same light as a secondary distributor,
and the operators should not be liable for defamation unless they know
of the defamatory character of the transmission.
The question remains whether any of these conclusions are either
compelled or forbidden by the first amendment. I argue below that ex-
isting first amendment doctrine gives at least this much breathing space
to computer bulletin boards, and sometimes gives more. But the answer
to the question is neither simple nor certain.1 26 Some of the well-known
cases may or may not apply to computer bulletin boards. Under New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan'2= and its successors, just how much free-
dom state law must give defamatory statements depends in part on
what and whom the statements are about. Moreover, the Supreme
Court is not yet clearly satisfied with the rules it has enunciated. Re-
cent cases 28 (and commentary)' 29 have indicated some dissatisfaction
125. It could be argued that this fear is chimerical because nobody will sue such operators due
to their limited resources. This argument, however, neglects three things. First, some private bulle-
tin board operators are rich, or insured Second, some defamed plaintiffs will want revenge even if
they do not get money; indeed, a major motive for litigation could be to put the offending board
out of business. And third, small bulletin board operators may stop the practice from fear of
liability, even if as a practical matter the liability is unlikely to arise.
126. This is the conclusion reached in Beck, Control of, and Access to, On-Line Computer
Data Bases: Some First Amendment Issues in Videotex and Teletext, 5 COMM/ENT L.J. 1, 9, 17,
18-19 (1982), an article that (notwithstanding its title) primarily discusses FCC regulation of the
industry.
127. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
128. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
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with established first amendment law. The Court has even hinted that
there may be a difference between defamation published by the media
and by the rest of us.130 And finally, the Court's application of different
first amendment rules to the printed and broadcast word 1 ' raises the
possibility-albeit slim in my view-that the Court could hold that
computer bulletin boards, too, are governed by different rules.
A. A Page of History
At the height of the civil rights movement, a group of individuals
under the name of the "Committee to defend Martin Luther King and
the struggle for freedom in the South" published a fund-raising adver-
tisement in the New York Times, claiming-not entirely inaccu-
rately-that Dr. King had been mistreated in a number of specific
ways. Sullivan, who supervised the Montgomery, Alabama police, sued
and recovered a judgment for $500,000 damages on the ground that
the statements in the advertisement were false, defamatory, and under-
stood by several people to refer to him. The Supreme Court, in New
York Times v. Sullivan,1 32 held that under the first amendment, public
officials cannot recover damages for defamatory falsehoods about their
official conduct unless they can prove "that the statement was made
with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.11 33 By the end of the
decade, the Court had concluded that the New York Times standard
extended to all those appearing "to the public to [have] substantial re-
sponsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs,"' " to
unofficial conduct of officeholders 35 and candidates for public office, 30
and to "public figures" as well as to actual or would-be holders of gov-
129. E.g., Symposium, Defamation and the First Amendment: New Perspectives, 25 win. &
MARY L. REv. 743 (1984); Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L REv. 422
(1975); Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L REV. 603 (1983).
130. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
132. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
133. Id. at 280-81. The Court also held that general criticism of govcrnmcntal conduct cannot
serve as a basis for a libel action by specific government officials. In that case, Sullivan had not
been specifically named and had brought his lawsuit on the ground that the criticism of the Mont-
gomery police department had been understood by several people to refer to him. See Id. at 288-
92.
134. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (supervisor of a publicly owned ski resort).
135. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
136. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
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ernmental offices.187
But the New York Times standard is not a universal rule. After
some backing and filling,138 a bare majority in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. L9 held that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault,
the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liabil-
ity for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to
a private individual. 1 40
B. The Currently Unsettled Law
The rules so far stated seem clear in outline, though occasionally
requiring some difficult characterization. Under the first amendment,
damages can be recovered for defamation of a public official or public
figure for statements relevant to that person's public status only if the
statements were published with-at least reckless disregard of their truth
or falsity. Damages for other defamation can be recovered if the de-
fendant was negligent with regard to the falsity of the statement.1 41
But "things are not always as they seem, 142 and so it is here.
First, the Gertz decision itself is under considerable stress. In Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,1 43 a badly fragmented
majority of the Court refused to apply Gertz's holding on punitive
damages to punitive damages imposed for defamatory financial state-
ments communicated by a credit service to its customers. A different
137. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (state university athletic director
and prominent retired military officer taking well-publicized positions on public affairs). As to just
where the line is drawn between "public figures" and the rest of us, see Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (engaging in crime does not necessarily a public figure make);
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (same as to receipt of federal grant); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (public figure as to some issues by voluntarily injecting
oneself into controversy).
138. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (five separate opinions, none of the
Court, supporting judgment).
139. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
140. Id. at 347. In context,fault means at least negligence as to falsity when the statement on
its face indicates defamatory potential and may mean more if the statement is innocent on its
face. Id. at 347 n.10, 348.
The Court also held that in order to recover "presumed or punitive damages," even a private
plaintiff has to prove at least "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 349.
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), a badly fragmented
Court concluded (in three separate opinions supporting a 5-4 judgment) that this aspect of Gertz
did not apply when the speech did not relate to a matter of public concern-specifically, to a
credit bureau's erroneous report about an individual's financial status.
141. See supra note 140.
142. WS. GILBERT, H.M.S. PINAFORE, Act II, No. 14 (Duet), line 1.
143. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality).
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majority, however, agreed that the result-supported by Justice Powell,
the author of the Gertz opinion, but by no other member of the major-
ity in that case144a-was flatly inconsistent with Gertz. 45 And the re-
placement of Justice Powell by Justice Kennedy adds yet another un-
known to the equation. It is possible, but doubtful, that Dun &
Bradstreet indicates dissatisfaction with the holding on liability as well.
Both Justice White and then Chief Justice Burger flatly called for over-
ruling Gertz. 46 Justice Powell's plurality opinion, although explicitly
limited to the question of punitive damages, characterized Gertz only
as "restrict[ing] the damages that a private individual could obtain
from a publisher for a libel that involved a matter of public con-
cern,".14 7 although when writing for the Court in Gertz he had doubted
the ability of courts to determine what issues were of "general or public
interest" and which were not.1 48 But in other cases, the Court for thirty
years has insisted that strict liability has no place in first amendment
law. In Smith v. California,14 9 the Court struck down a California or-
dinance imposing strict liability on booksellers found in possession of
obscene materials, although it expressly reserved the question what
state of mind would be constitutionally sufficient.' And although the
Court has not significantly expanded Smith, it has continued to cite it
regularly both in obscenity and in libel cases.' 51 There is no reason to
believe that dissatisfaction with Gertz extends to its general require-
ment of fault.
Second, the Court has recently suggested that there may be a dif-
ferent standard depending on whether the defamation was published by
a "media defendant" or a private person.'52 Although at least three
144. Justice Powell, of course, is no longer a member of the Court.
145. See id. at 772 (White, J., concurring in the judgment), 785 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment), 772-73 (White, J., concurring in
the judgment).
147. Id. at 751.
148. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
149. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
150. Id. at 154. The Court in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974). held that
knowledge of the contents, "character and nature" of the materials was sufficient, even if the
defendant did not know that the materials were legally obscene.
151. E.g., Hamling, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 789 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) ("Nor necd we con-
sider what standards would apply if the plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant."). Occasional lower
courts have so held. See, e.g., Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 883 (1982).
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Justices are on record as opposing any such distinction5 3 and the Court
has in the past rejected distinctions between the press and ordinary
people in other contexts,154 the fact that it has been explicitly raised
means that at least some Justices are willing to consider some such
distinction. But although the Court has raised the question, it has not
even hinted at the contours of any distinction between media and
others; speculation in this regard is beyond the scope of this article,155
Finally, it is possible that the Court might conclude that the new
technology involved in computer bulletin boards, like that of radio and
television broadcasting, warrants a different set of first amendment
rules than those applied to the spoken and printed word. It has in the
past reached similar conclusions for radio and television broadcasts,150
Since computer bulletin boards share some of the characteristics of ra-
dio and television broadcasting,1 57 such a conclusion is possible. But it
153. Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. 767 (Brennan, J., concurring); Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 773 & n.4 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). One might count five, since in
Dun & Bradstreet Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Marshall, stated in
dissent that the rights of the institutionalized media are "no greater and no less than those en-
joyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities." Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 784 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, Justice Stevens, in dissent, and Justice Mar-
shall, who was a member of the majority, did not repeat that proposition in Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
154. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978) (corporate advertising); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (no special constitutional rule for press subpoenas); see also New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (applying the rule of the case to the individual peti-
tioners as well as the Times).
155. If, as I have argued, computer bulletin boards transmitting information provided by third
parties are sometimes analogous to those who merely provide a facility for dissemination (like the
telephone company) and sometimes to those who are at most secondary publishers (like booksell-
ers and telegraph companies), the media/nonmedia distinction would seem to be beside the point,
See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (holding that a bookseller could not be convicted for
selling obscene materials in the absence of knowledge of what he was selling). At least one appel-
late court has given a computerized information retrieval service access to state information. See
Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1985).
156. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (government may re-
quire license to broadcast); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcast-
ers may be ordered to give reply time in cases involving personal attacks or editorials); FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (government may prohibit broadcast of some "inde-
cent," although not constitutionally obscene, material); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981)
(limited but compulsory access to broadcast time).
157. They are a means of communication unfamiliar to the Framers. They involve interstate
communication by wire, and in fact the FCC has concluded that it could take jurisdiction over
such services, even though it has declined to do so. See generally Becker, Electronic Publishing:
First Amendment Issues in the Twenty-First Century, 13 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 801, 822-27 (1985)
for a good discussion of the regulatory history. (I share a first initial and last name with that
author, but we are unrelated and have never met.) If the use of such boards increases, it is even
possible that questions of the allocation of scarce resources may arise, since the capacity of inter-
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is unlikely for several reasons. First, although the Court has held that
some different first amendment rules apply to broadcasting, it has never
even hinted at a distinction in the area of defamation.' Second, the
Court reached its conclusions with regard to broadcasting giving heavy
deference to the considered Congressional judgment that broadcasters
could be regulated. 59 Absent action by Congress to regulate bulletin
boards, it is unlikely the Court would strike out on its own into such a
new technological area, especially when special treatment of broadcast-
ing is under heavy attack within and without the government.16 0
C. Bulletin Boards
The overview presented above leads to some clear, and other ind-f-
inite, conclusions about the limits of potential liability for bulletin
board operators.
1. The Bedrock Requirement of Fault
Liability without fault, if it ever was permissible, is no longer per-
missible. In other words, the old asserted strict-liability rule for pub-
lishers of printed material cannot be applied either to them or to com-
puter bulletin board operators consistent with the first amendment.
This much, at least, follows from the continued viability of Smith v.
California.'61
It is less clear, however, just what may comprise the constitution-
ally required showing of "fault." It could be that the general standard I
argue for in Part III-no liability without actual knowledge of the de-
famatory character of the material transmitted-is in fact the constitu-
tional line. But although the Supreme Court has held something very
much like this to be sufficient,' it has not held it necessary in all cir-
cumstances. 6 3 Further, in the broadcast area, one state court found not
state telephone lines is not infinite.
158. Indeed, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) in-
volved defamatory material distributed by computer.
159. See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 379-86.
160. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the
General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985) (FCC
Position). Published criticism is legion; a good and otherwise representative example is Krat-
tenmaker & Powe, The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible
Dream, 1985 DUKE LJ. 151.
161. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
162. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
163. Cf. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 733 (1968) (holding that failure to
investigate the possible falsity of information prior to publication does not establish the "reckless
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only "fault" but also "reckless disregard" when a broadcaster failed to
make use of a delay system on a talk show."" It is therefore possible
that, at least in some circumstances, the first amendment would allow a
bulletin board operator to be found liable for failure to police his board
and remove public defamatory notices.165 Private transmissions, such as
electronic mail, should in any event be protected under Smith so long
as the operator does not ordinarily read those private transmissions,
since "fault" can hardly be found in the failure to read other people's
mail.
2. Different Strokes for Different Folks
Mere fault, however, is not all that is required. Under New York
Times and its progeny, "reckless disregard" of the probable falsity of
information must be shown if that information relates to a public offi-
cial or a "public figure" on matters of general importance. 66 In prac-
tice there may be little difference between this standard and the one
proposed in Part III, since in the normal course of events the operator
is likely to hear about the defamatory material by an angry message
from the person who thinks he is defamed. To the extent there is a
difference, however, and absent a wholesale revision of the New York
Times standard, the first amendment gives even more protection than
the proposed standard to some classes of defamatory statements.
disregard" required by Times v. Sullivan unless the publisher acts with a "high degree of aware-
ness" that the material is probably false).
164. Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp., 251 So. 2d 405 (La. App.), application
denied, 259 La. 885, 253 So. 2d 217 (1971) (La. 1971). Although the court found that the radio
station had issued an "open invitation to make any statement a listener desired, regardless of how
untrue or defamatory it might be," the evidence on which that characterization was based showed
little more than the ordinary invitation to callers to phone in their information. Id. at 410.
165. I have argued above that the general application of such a rule would deprive bulletin
boards of much of their openness and attractiveness to users and would impose such a burden,
particularly on amateur operators, that many would have to shut down their boards. See supra
notes 124-25 and accompanying text. However, even if this argument is correct and also identifies
an issue of constitutional magnitude, "fault" might be found for failure to police the board over
long periods of time, for instance, or in circumstances where the operator knew that some person
or people were regularly logging on and posting defamatory messages. In Dun & Bradstreet, one
of the factors relied on by the lower courts (and mentioned, but not passed on by the Supreme
Court) was that Dun & Bradstreet had failed to follow its usual checking procedures with regard
to the information distributed. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
752 (1985).
166. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
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3. A Different First Amendment for Bulletin Boards?
Finally, there is little chance that the Court vill hold the first
amendment applies in a different way to computer bulletin boards than
to more traditional means of disseminating information. That an indus-
try is technologically new does not of itself mean that different consti-
tutional rules should apply to it. Moreover, even if the Court continues
the Red Lion tradition that broadcasters are governed by a slightly dif-
ferent first amendment than the rest of us, most of the special features
found determinative in broadcasting are irrelevant to bulletin boards
and in any event have not been fouod relevant to defamation cases,
where the liability of broadcasters has been judged by the same rules
applied to more traditional means of expression. 07 The spectre of dif-
ferent rules for computer bulletin boards is a chimera.
V. CONCLUSION
Computer bulletin boards are a new and growing medium of com-
munication. When used by people other than the operators of the
boards to transmit messages and other information, they are very dif-
ferent from the now traditional media of books, magazines, radio, and
television. Instead of presenting the ideas of the few to the many, they
allow for an interchange of ideas among the many. The closest analo-
gies in existing law are thus not to print publishers and broadcasters,
but to telegraph and telephone companies.
Calling something a computer bulletin board describes it no more
precisely than calling it a corporation. Computer bulletin boards are
not a single, unitary entity. Instead, they provide a number of services
used in different ways. The law of defamation should not treat all those
services identically. When a board is used for the private distribution of
information, as through private mail and file areas, it should be treated
as nothing more than a service renting its equipment and facilities to
users-like the telephone company, it should not be liable for any defa-
mation so transmitted, because it has not published the information.
On the other hand, when a computer bulletin board makes information
provided by third parties generally available, as in public message and
file areas, it is acting like a news vendor or distributor. In these circum-
stances, the bulletin board is indeed a publisher of any defamatory in-
formation so passed along, but it should be liable, like such secondary
publishers, only upon a showing of fault.
167. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
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These conclusions from traditional defamation law are reinforced
by the first amendment. Indeed, in some circumstances-for instance,
where the defamation relates to conduct relevant to the performance of
a public official-it is clear that the first amendment requires an even
higher standard: a showing of "actual malice" under New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan. Even where "purely private" defamation is involved, it
may be that the first amendment will be held to require more, but the
law in this area is presently in a condition of extraordinary uncertainty.
Traditional principles of the law of defamation, at least, provide a safe
and reasonably comfortable level of protection for bulletin board
operators.
